Iran’s new history is a rollercoaster of differentiations, shifting back and forth among trust and depression, customs and modernisation, transformations and counterrevolutions, traditionalism and reformism.
After President Ebrahim Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash last month, the nation is once more on the verge of a historic moment as it prepares for a snap election on June 28. Is the political establishment willing to ease internal social and political tensions and open up to the outside world, or will it prefer to keep the growing divide between the Iranian people and the government at home while pursuing aggressive policies abroad? After a tumultuous few years in Iran, if it chooses the former, we may witness a period of governance and normalization.
Be that as it may, in the event that the last option happens, the authenticity emergency Iran has encountered will wait on, fuelled by unsettled homegrown complaints, and constraining the state to keep on zeroing in on overseeing emergencies.
The president who wins this election will only give a partial explanation of what will happen. Beyond the highest authority One of the most complex political structures in the world, Iran’s political structure has been based on Velayet-e Motlaqaye Faqih, or the absolute guardianship of the Islamic jurist, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
In this framework, the Vali-e Faqih, or the watchman of Islamic law specialists (presently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) is the preeminent pioneer, and has sacred power over open, state and strict undertakings. The supreme leader, according to this political theology, is in charge of protecting the state until the return of the 12th divinely ordained Shia imam (also known as the Hidden Imam), who, according to the majority of Shia Muslims, has been in occultation since 874.
The supreme leader in Iran holds a lot of power and theoretically has the final say over state affairs. In any case, that doesn’t intend that there is an imposing business model over power, and there are other power places with huge influence. The legislature, the judiciary, and the executive are the first three layers of the power structure.
One cannot simply call any of these power centers “symbolic.” Instead, each holds significant power and influence over the others, which occasionally results in power struggles. However, due to the role played by the assemblies and councils, the second layer of the power structure, these do not paralyze the system.
The preeminent pioneer, the governing body, the legal executive and the chief choose most of the individuals from these congregations and boards, with the rest of by general society. When disagreements or crises arise among the institutions, these numerous assemblies and councils, such as the Assembly of Experts, the Supreme National Security Council, the Expediency Discernment Council of the System, and the Guardian Council, act like a parallel state and intervene in state affairs.
The country’s power balance is determined by how members of the various political currents accepted by the state are distributed within these institutions. Councils and assemblies are far more active and in charge than the government and parliament in many instances, including nuclear activities, sensitive regional policies, national security, and national security.
However, their power is still below that of the supreme leader. The Islamic Progressive Gatekeeper Corps (IRGC), a world class Iranian equipped power with command over cutting edge weapons and huge venture projects in different business fields, is one more layer of the foundation that essentially affects Iran’s provincial and global strategies.
Iran’s politics and decision-making processes are greatly influenced by the Revolutionary Guards and their paramilitary volunteer militia, the Basij. Retired IRGC generals frequently enter politics, running for president or supporting a particular candidate, holding executive positions in parliament and banks, and so on. A candidate’s victory in an election is frequently determined by that support.
The business community adds yet another layer to Iran’s power structure. During Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency, shortly after the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, which destroyed the country’s infrastructure and manufacturing capacity, the majority of the families in this group received promotions and privileges.
After the war, this class was expected to lead reconstruction, revive the failing economy, and encourage industrial production. It is having a greater impact on Iranian politics. And afterward there are the Muslim chiefs, most of whom accept their schooling and strict degrees from the country’s biggest Islamic theological college in the city of Qom, and partake in some impact in navigation, prevailing in the presidential election.
A few heavyweight names from different political flows have presented their applications to run for president. However, their candidacy must be approved by the 12-member Guardian Council by June 11—half of whom are appointed by the supreme leader and the other half by parliament.
The Guardian Council’s decision will be influenced by consensus and power struggles among the aforementioned organizations, making it difficult to predict. One of the front-runners, Ali Larijani, is thought to have a good chance of winning if reformists vote and turnout is high.
He is frequently portrayed as pragmatic because he is a moderate conservative. Larijani is a member of a prominent Muslim scholar family whose members have held influential positions ever since the revolution in 1979. He has a bachelor’s degree in science and a doctorate in Western philosophy from the Qom religious seminary. In addition to holding positions within the security establishment, Larijani was speaker of parliament from 2008 to 2020 and currently serves as a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, an advisory body.
The Gatekeeper Board excluded him from running for president in 2021, yet many accept the preeminent pioneer has given his endorsement this time. A strong candidate would be Larijani, who is widely regarded as a flexible politician who may reengage in nuclear negotiations with the West. A Larijani candidacy would appeal to voters in both the conservative and reformist camps.
However, Larijani’s relative popularity among conservatives and reformists may make it difficult to strike a balance because he must, on the one hand, remain loyal to the establishment while also promising change to appeal to reformists during protests in 2022, when anti-government sentiment is still strong. Saeed Jalili is a hardline conservative politician who is also a member of the Expediency Discernment Council. If he wins the presidential election, he would take a very different path than Larijani.
A well known figure among moderates, the previous atomic moderator has solid binds with the incomparable pioneer and the Progressive Monitors, and is seen as a resolute follower. Jalili has previously lost his attempt to become president, losing to Hassan Rouhani in 2013. He abandoned the election in 2021 in favor of Raisi, a fellow conservative.
Due to the close relationship between the two men and what is widely believed to have been Jalili’s influence on the former president’s decisions, it is expected that Jalili will continue with Raisi’s policies if he becomes president.
A low turnout political decision would help Jalili out, as it would probably imply that reformists have chosen to pass on the political decision, leaving preservationists – Jalili’s principal supporters – to rule the democratic stalls. There are two additional candidates, in addition to Jalili and Larijani, that merit consideration.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is the current speaker of the Iranian Parliament and is a moderate conservative. He was Tehran’s mayor from 2005 to 2017 and is thought to be a technocrat. He also has a lot of connections to Iran’s security because he was previously chief of police and commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ Air Force. Among those in the official race, Ghalibaf is viewed as the most firmly lined up with the IRGC. It is also known that Khamenai is close to Ghalibaf. His odds of winning the election are greatly enhanced by these connections.
However, his presidential campaign will not go as planned because he is frequently the target of Jalili-affiliated and ultra-conservative media. Eshaq Jahangiri is the only well-known reformist candidate who has submitted a presidential campaign application. From 2013 to 2021, he was the first vice president under Hassan Rouhani’s administration. Prior to that, from 1997 to 2005, Jahangiri served as the minister of industries and mines under Mohammad Khatami, the first reformist president of the Islamic republic.
He also participated in the reformist Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s 2009 presidential campaign, which ended in a disputed election but sparked protests by the Green Movement. Throughout his political career, Jahangiri has consistently backed reformist or moderate-centrist politicians. He has never directly and openly opposed the political establishment, despite some hopes that he might unite reformists.
The reformists remain clearly divided because they lack a strong leader, a comprehensive narrative to define their position, and unity. Jahangiri’s just opportunity is in Iran’s factional governmental issues. Reformist voters may mobilize to support Jahangiri in order to prevent the hardline conservative Saeed Jalili from winning the election. Much depends on how many people vote in the presidential election.
The political establishment in Iran has traditionally relied heavily on high participation rates as their primary source of public legitimacy. However, the ruling elite’s pressing concern has been the record-low turnout in the last two elections. In addition, despite the fact that the state has largely been successful in putting an end to the anti-government protests that began in 2022, a significant number of Iranians are reluctant to grant the Islamic republic legitimacy by participating in the elections.
To stay away from an authenticity emergency, the framework will probably try to fabricate an apparently cutthroat race with the goal that there will be a few up-and-comers on the polling form to create public help and secure a high turnout. However, those who are permitted to run will adhere to the Islamic republic’s system. In point of fact, the country’s domestic and international policies will not be significantly altered by the winner of the race, given that the IRGC will continue to play a dominant role and the supreme leader will remain unchanged. Iran’s political framework is dug in – and those within are not ready to relinquish power.
